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I.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

A JUDGMENT BASED UPON AN ORAL MODIFICATION OF A
WRITTEN CONTRACT THAT PROHIBITS ORAL MODIFICATION
CANNOT STAND.

There is no cause of action in Utah for breach of an oral
modification
modification.

of

a

written

contract

that

prohibits

oral

The subject contract contains clear language that

the contract could only be modified in writing.

While under Utah

law this language does not prohibit a separate oral contract to
modify the parties7 relationship, it does protect the integrity of
the parties' original agreement.
There is no dispute between the parties that Appellee
never complied with the provisions of the written contract which
only allowed modifications in writing. Although Appellee claimed
a breach of oral contract all the way through trial, he did not
submit that claim to the jury.

Rather, Appellee submitted the

claim for breach of oral modification.
Cook raised this issue as an affirmative defense, raised
it during a parol evidence objection and argued it before the final
judgment and award of attorney fees was entered.

Although, the

issue may not have been "artfully" preserved, a judgment based on
a cause of action that doesn't exist cannot stand.
In any event, the issue cannot be ignored on appeal as it
relates to attorney fees.

After the jury verdict, but before

attorney fees were awarded, Appellants pointed out to the trial
court the injustice that would result if a party to a contract that
expressly stated it could only be modified in writing found himself
1

saddled with fees, not for failing to comply with the written
contract, but for failing to follow terms of an oral modification
the parties had agreed could not exist.
B.

BEFORE THE COURT WILL AWARD ATTORNEY FEES THE
PREVAILING PARTY MUST SHOW THAT ATTORNEY FEES WERE
ACTUALLY INCURRED.

The court will not award attorney fees unless the party
seeking them can show he actually paid them or is obligated to pay
them.

The award of attorney fees is compensation not a windfall.
Cook argued this issue claiming that Appellee had made no

showing that he paid or was obligated to pay attorney fees.

Cook

argued further that it was probable during this heated contest for
Cook's Congressional

Seat that someone other than Appellee had

obligated himself to pay them.

Although, this issue was placed

squarely before Appellee, Appellee provided absolutely no evidence
that he paid or was obligated to do so.

Appellee did not even

provide a statement in his affidavit in support of attorney fees
that he was obligated to pay.

Without evidence in the record of

payment or obligation to pay, the award of attorney fees must be
vacated.
C.

COOK PREVAILED ON A PROVISION OF THE WRITTEN
CONTRACT AND SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES.

The trial court erroneously applied the "net judgment"
rule in awarding attorney fees.

This court has held that when each

party has rights under the contract and the contractual provision
awarding

attorney

fees

awards

them

for

prevailing

on

"any"

provision or right then the net judgment rule is inapplicable.

2

Each party has a claim of right for attorney fees for the provision
or right they succeeded in enforcing.
II.

OBJECTION TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee's

statement

of

the

case

misinterprets

the

integrated written contract which is the subject of this suit.
There is no support for Appellee's interpretation in the findings
of the trial court.

Even if there were such findings, the parties

agree that the interpretation of a contract is a question of law to
which this Court gives no deference to the findings below.

Cook

offers the following in aid of this Court's interpretation of this
integrated contract.
Appellee has suggested that the contract was not for full
campaign

services

through

the convention, primary

and general

election cycles but rather for full services through the convention
cycle only and limited services through the primary and general
election cycles. [Brief of Appellee at 3] . This interpretation is
incorrect. The contract was for full service all the way through to
the general election.
The convention cycle is an intensive one-on-one campaign
to individual delegates. It requires personal delegate contact.
[Trial Transcript, Day 5, pp. 31-33; Trial Transcript, Day 7 pp.
230-31.]

The parties agreed that Appellee would be paid $40,000.00

during this two month intensive campaign cycle.

[Exhibit 17P, %

4(b)] .
Once

the

convention

cycle

is

successful

the

labor

intensive one-on-one ends and the campaign focus shifts to mass
3

media. [Trial Transcript, Day 8, pp. 6-7, 10; Trial Transcript, Day
5, pp. 31-33; Trial Transcript, Day 7, pp. 230-31.]
now

becomes

the primary

focus

of

the

campaign.

Fund raising
The

contract

reflects this focus in paying Appellee 15% of PAC money raised and
[Exhibit 17P, % 4(c)].

a $4,000 per month fee.

If the campaign

were to be successful it required PAC money thus the contract
provided that during the primary and general election cycles the
bulk of Appellee's compensation to be from PAC money.
There is absolutely nothing in the contract that even
hints that it was not a full service contract. In light of campaign
realities,

the

contract

is

written

to

compensate

Appellee

proportionally to the type of labor Appellee contracted to do in
each cycle of the campaign.

[Exhibit 17P, f 4 ] .

In fact, the

contract states "In particular, Nielson shall oversee all general
consulting
Further,
successful

for
the

the

campaign."

contract

election

at

[Id.,

allows
each

for

stage

% 2,

bonuses
of

the

emphasis
to

added].

Appellee

campaign:

at

upon
the

convention ($5,000), in the primary election ($5,000), and in the
general election
obviously

for

($25,000).

full

campaign

[Id., % 4(e)].
services

through

The contract was
the

convention,

primary and general election cycles and not for full services
through the convention cycle only and limited services through the
primary and general election cycles.
Appellee not only misinterprets the written contract,
Appellee also misrepresents the record about payments that Cook
made. Appellee suggests Cook acknowledged the validity of invoices
4

by "direct[ing] payments to specific invoices." [Brief of Appellee
at 4 ] . This is an incorrect statement of the record.
Appellee

prepared

and

delivered

invoices

that

were

correct under the terms of the written contract. Then, later,
fabricated new invoices. [Cf. Exhibit 23aD with Exhibits 77P, 78P,
79P; cf. Exhibit 153P with Exhibit 93 P (Invoice 96244);
Transcript, Day 5, pp. 85-89].

Trial

Cook, in the intense heat of the

political battle, did not personally review the invoices.

Cook

authorized periodic payments owed under the terms of the written
contract, but did not direct them to particular invoices.

The

actual payments were made by a secretary, who arbitrarily assigned
payments to invoices.

[Trial Transcript, Day 7, pp. 49-56, 92, 98,

124, 127-28, 151-52].
In complete disregard for the truth of what the record
shows, Appellee claims the jury found Cook to have breached the
written contract.

[Brief of Appellee, at 26, n. 4 ] .

Appellee

cites Exhibit 153P for the proposition that Cook failed to pay
$2,086.00 of the $40,000.00 of the pre-convention portion of the
contract.

Exhibit 153P actually shows that the $40,000.00 was

completely

paid

in

installments.

The

$2,086.00

was

part

of

Appellee's claimed "oral modification." [Trial Transcript, Day 2,
pp. 95-96].
III.

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ADDRESS ALL ISSUES ON
APPEAL, EVEN IF SOME WERE OMITTED FROM THE ORIGINAL
DOCKETING STATEMENT.
Appellee argues that Cook is barred from appealing the

trial court's award of attorney fees because Cook failed to include
5

this issue m
at 29-31].

his original docketing statement.

[Brief of Appellee

Appellee is wrong.
The original final judgment, entered May 31, 2 000, did

not include an award of attorney fees.
docketing statement on July 20, 2000.
vacated by che trial court.

Cook filed the original
The original judgment was

[R2356-2360] .

On December 22, 2000

the trial court entered a new judgment which included attorney
fees.

Cock filed a new timely notice of appeal.

This court

notified Cock of the briefing schedule which was based on the first
appeal.

Upon

advice

of

the

Clerk,

Cook moved

the

court

to

consolidate the two appeals in order to keep the briefing schedule.
The Clerk specifically advised Cook that a new docketing statement
was unnecessary.

Nevertheless, upon Appellee making it an issue,

Cook amended the docketing statement.
In Nelson ex. rel. Struckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d
568 (Utah 1596) , this Court noted " [t]he docketing statement is for
the benefit of the Court, not the appellee".
claim

it

was

prejudiced

by

any

Thus, Appellee cannot

deficiency

in

the

docketing

statement, since the docketing statement is not for Appellee's
benefit.
Appellee cites only Brooks v. Department of Employment
Security, 735 P.2d 241, (Utah App. 1987), a two paragraph decision
of the Court of appeals, which is clearly distinguishable.
of Appellee at 29] .
because

the

appellant

[Brief

The Court of Appeals dismissed that case
did

not

amend

the

docketing

statement

although the Court of Appeals instructed the appellant to amend it.
6

Indeed, Rule 9 jurisprudence is replete with authority that issues
may

be

added

to

a

docketing

prejudice to the appellee.

statement

by

amendment

without

In Nelson, the Court noted:

"We see no merit in the [appellee's] argument
that [the appellant's] failure to list all
issues presented for review in his original
docketing statement dooms his appeal.
[The
appellant] filed timely notices of appeal from
both trial court orders. He then submitted a
docketing statement . . . [The appellant]
subsequently
filed
an amended
docketing
statement that included the other issues
presented for appeal. [The appellee] moved to
strike the statement for being untimely filed.
The issues [the appellant] targeted for appeal
were stated in his amended docketing statement
and were thoroughly discussed in his brief.
. . . In short, [the appellant's] failure to
list all issues for review in the docketing
statement did not affect his right to raise
later specified issues for appeal.
Accordingly, Appellee is not prejudiced by the amended
docketing statement and Cook is not barred from appealing the trial
Court's award of attorney fees.
IV.

A JUDGMENT BASED ON A NON-EXISTENT CAUSE OF ACTION CANNOT
BE ALLOWED TO STAND.
The parties

both agree

that

,?

[w]hether

the

Services

Agreement in this case could be orally modified is a question of
law with no deference given to the trial court's ruling."
Appellee at 1.]

Brief of

Likewise, there is no dispute that whether or not

a contract that can be modified was in fact modified is a question
of fact, and that findings of fact that are clearly erroneous must
be set aside.

Id.

The parties diverge on the answer to both the legal and
the factual question.

While it is true in Utah that a provision in
7

a contract that prohibits oral modification of the contract will
not stop the parties from entering into a new oral contract on the
same subject matter, the courts of this state have never condoned
the violence that is done to the parties' expectations by simply
ignoring that provision of the contract.1
As to the factual issue, Appellee, under questioning from
his own lawyer, admitted that the parties to this agreement had
never complied with paragraph 15 of their agreement which only
allowed modifications of the agreement if they were in writing.
[Trial Transcript, Day 2, pp. 165-66].

Given this admission of a

party it was not necessary for Defendant to further marshal the
facts.

If the contract, as a matter of law, can only be modified

in writing, and Appellee admits it was not modified in writing, any
factual finding that the contract was properly modified was clearly
erroneous.
(jury

See, e.g. , Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P. 2d 727 (Utah 1982)

verdict

cannot

stand

where

undisputed

facts

preclude

finding).
A.

THIS COURT CANNOT ALLOW A JUDGMENT ON A NONEXISTENT CAUSE OF ACTION TO STAND, EVEN IF THE
ISSUE WAS UNARTFULLY PRESERVED BELOW.

Cook is not, on this appeal, arguing that the trial court
simply gave an erroneous instruction.

Rather, this is a case where

a judgment was entered on a cause of action that did not exist
(oral modification to an agreement the parties agreed could not be
1

Plaintiff suggests that this question is one of first
impression. It is not. This Court as far back as 1932 explained
that, although, a new contract could be entered into, the provision
preventing oral modification would be enforced. Salzner v. Jos. J.
Snell Estate Corp., 16 P.2d 923, 925 (Utah 1932).
8

orally modified) .

The fact that this cause of action does not

exist in Utah was squarely brought to the trial court's attention,
after the jury verdict but before entry of judgment, in the posttrial motions.
put

it

in

The Court ignored the issue.2 While, as this Court

State

v.

Haston,

846

P. 2d

1276,

(Utah

1993)

the

preservation of the issue may have been "tardy and unartful" the
issue was sufficiently preserved to allow this Court to vacate a
judgment on a non-existent cause of action.3
When judgment is entered on a cause of action that does
not exist, it simply cannot be allowed to stand.
Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993).

See State v.

Judgment cannot properly be

entered on a jury verdict that does not support a cause of action,
and the issue can be pursued on appeal even though no motion was
made below.

Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 310 n. 7

(10th Cir. 1985)

("A party need not have moved for a directed

verdict in order to question on appeal whether the judgment was a
proper one to enter on a special verdict.")

2

The issue had previously been raised as an affirmative
defense, [R73] was acknowledged by Plaintiff's testimony in the
trial, where he admitted there was no written modification but
thumbed his nose at the contract he authored, [Trial Transcript,
Day 2, pp. 165-66] and the issue was raised, but rejected by the
Court's overruling of Defendants' parol evidence objection. [Trial
Transcript, Day 2, pp. 83-84].
3

In Haston a criminal case in which the defendant was
convicted of a crime that did not exist, the defendant did not
raise the issue until on appeal, and then only in a footnote.
Haston, 846 P. 2d at 1277. In any event, this issue was not tardily
raised as it relates to an award of attorney fees under this
contract. Before there had been any finding as to attorney fees
this issue was squarely presented to the trial court who ignored
the issue. [R2028-2040, R2232-2242, R 2450-2460].
9

This case is a good candidate for the application of this
principle.

Two very sophisticated men, bargaining over something

as fundamental as the processes by which our members of Congress
are elected, chose to memorialize their agreement in writing.
further

stabilized

the agreement by agreeing

that

contract cannot be modified except in writing.
drafted by R.T. Nielson.
provision was not met.

He admitted

the

They

written

The contract was

in open court that

the

At the last minute, for tactical reasons,

he withdrew from the jury the legally recognized cause of action,
i.e., was there an oral contract

supplementing

these parties'

written unmodified agreement, and instead only submitted a question
that both parties now agree can be answered as a legal question,
i.e., whethei: this contract can be orally modified.
this tactical
Appellee

Having made

decision in his greed to collect attorney

should

not

be

allowed

to uphold

this

verdict

fees,
on

a

nonexistent claim when the recognized claim could have been, but at
Appellee's request was not, submitted to this jury.
B.
• '

IN UTAH NO CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS FOR ORAL
MODIFICATION OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT THAT ITSELF
PRECLUDES ORAL MODIFICATION.

Appellee misstates the holding of five Utah cases trying
to support the proposition that a written contract that expressly
forbids oral modification can be orally modified anyway. [Brief of
Appellee at 17-20] . Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc. , 348 P.2d 337 (Utah
1960); Prince v. R.C. Tolman, 610 P.2d 1267 (Utah 1980); Fisher v.
Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172 (Ut. App. 1995); Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d
8 6 (Utah 1963); PLC Landscape Const, v. Picadilly Fish 'N Chips,
10

Inc. , 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1972) . None of these
cases support that proposition.

The cases do allow parties whose

contracts prohibit oral modification of their written agreement to
enter into new agreements on the same subject matter.

This is

allowed precisely because it is a new agreement, not a modification
of the written contract.
The case of Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 348 P. 2d 337
(Utah 1960) clearly explains this distinction.
parties

entered

into a

supply

contract

In that case the

under which

specified

amounts of roofing materials were to be supplied at an agreed upon
price.

Additional

material under the contract

ordered upon written authorization.

could only be

After these agreements were

entered the project was expanded and the defendant ordered more
materials without the required written authorization.
held

the plaintiff

was

entitled

to recover

This Court

the value of

the

additional materials, not because parties are allowed to ignore
material provisions they have agreed to, but "because the parties
actually entered into a new agreement. . . . "4
a new trial, which was also appealed.
363 P.2d 498 (Utah 1961).

The Court granted

Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc.,

In the second appeal the Court made it

crystal clear why the plaintiff was given judgment.
. . .What was done need not necessarily be
regarded as an attempt to vary or obviate the
terms
of
the
written
contract
. ..
[defendants] could and did enter into a
4

The Davis case relied upon Salzner v. Jos. J. Snell Estate
Corp. , 16 P.2d 923, 925 (Utah 1932) which held that the contractual
prohibition against oral modification "does not apply to work done
pursuant to alterations made by a subsequent agreement."
11

separate contract to purchase these additional
materials.
Id. at page 4 99.
That is Cook's position in this case.

Paragraph 15 of

the parties' agreement did not prevent proof of "a new agreement"
for additional services on the campaign, but it did preclude a
cause of action for oral modification of this agreement.5
The cases cited by Appellee are not to the contrary. In
Prince v.

R.C.

Tolman,

610 P. 2d

1267

(Utah

1980)

this

Court

affirmed the same principle that the provision in the original
contract that modifications need to be in writing does not preclude
a separate and subsequent agreement.
would

have

performed

his

subcontract

In that case the plaintiff
"except

for

defendant's

supplemental and separate agreement. . ." which the Court found
enforceable.
Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172 (Ut. App. 1995) stands
only for the proposition, irrelevant to this matter, that a written
contract that does not contain prohibition on oral modification can
be orally modified.
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963) was a case in
which parties to a written contract modified that contract with a
new written contract, also irrelevant to this matter.
There is no support in Utah law for the proposition that
the

parties'

express

limitation

5

on

oral

modification

can

be

In fact, these parties contemplated that additional
services could be purchased as part of separate agreements.
[Exhibit 17P, % 4 ] .
12

ignored.

Appellee

insupportable

in

apparent

position misquotes

desperation
a

case,

to

maintain

seeking

to hide

misquote by omitting proper brackets or ellipses.
Appellee at 19-20] .

this
the

[Brief of

PLC Landscape Const, v. Picadillv Fish 'N

Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1972) only
appears to support Appellee's position because Appellee only quoted
half a sentence.

PLC involved only oral contracts.

In PLC,

plaintiff claimed an original oral contract and a subsequent oral
modification of that oral contract.

In those circumstances the

court held:
Except
where a change, modification
or
addition to a contract may conflict with the
well-recognized rule against varying a written
contract by parol, there is nothing so
sacrosanct about having entered into one
agreement that it will prevent those parties
entering into any such change, modification,
extension or addition to their arrangement for
doing business with each other as they may
mutually agree. (Emphasis added).
Appellee

in his

quote

left

out

the

underlined

directly contradicts Appellee's position.

portion

which

In fact, each of the

cases cited by Appellee involve separate and independent contracts
or are completely irrelevant to this matter.
Reading all these cases honestly, a clear tenet of Utah
law becomes apparent.

In Utah we respect, to the fullest measure

possible, the freedom we have as a people to contract and to have
our contractual expectations fulfilled. Phone Directories Co. Inc.
v. Henderson, 8 P. 3d 256 (Utah 2000) . Unless the law or the party's
agreement otherwise

limit, a party's written

modified orally or in writing.

agreement

can be

But, if the parties have agreed not
13

to modify the agreement except in writing that agreement not to
modify orally will be respected.
recover

only

if

he

proves

In that circumstance a party can

a subsequent

and

independent

oral

contract.
Unless these cardinal rules are followed the parties
reasonable expectations are thwarted - - a s occurred in this case.
In this case, there is no finding of an independent and subsequent
oral

contract, but

the legally

irrelevant

finding

of

an

oral

modification.
C.

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY
AN ORAL MODIFICATION WHERE THE WRITTEN CONTRACT
EXPRESSLY PROHIBITS ORAL MODIFICATIONS.

In Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. P.J. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730
(Utah 1985) the Court denied an award of attorney fees because the
party seeking them prevailed on an oral contract subsequent to the
written contract.

The subsequent oral contract was an accord and

satisfaction which did not provide for attorney fees if breached.
The prevailing party

argued that because the written

contract

provided for attorney fees he should be awarded attorney

fees.

While the Court enforced the subsequent oral contract (finding that
the statute of frauds didn't prohibit a subsequent oral agreement)
it would not award attorney fees for breach of the oral contract
because the oral contract did not provide for attorney fees.
The concept is clear. This court will allow separate oral
contracts to be enforced notwithstanding a contractual prohibition
to oral modification of the statute of frauds as in the Golden Key
case.

But it will not allow an award of attorney fees for breach
14

of a claimed separate oral contract based upon a provision in the
written contract. The oral modification is a separate contract and
if attorney fees are awarded they must be provided for in the oral
modification.
Before the trial court entered judgment and before any
decision was made on attorney fees, Cook alerted the trial court to
the unambiguous law of Utah that written contracts which prohibit
oral modifications cannot be orally modified, though a separate
oral agreement can be enforced.
2460].

[R2028-2040, R2232-2242, R2450-

A review of the trial court's award of attorney fees for

breach of the oral modification reveals the poignancy of the wrong
done Cook.
The parties entered a written contract. They agreed it
could only be modified in writing. They also agreed that if any
provision of the written contract were enforced, the prevailing
party

would

be

awarded

its

attorney

fees.

The

parties

had

expectations based upon the written contract. Cook's contractual
expectations were trampled.
The jury actually found in favor of Cook on the written
contract. [R1945-1946]. The court, however, awarded only plaintiff
attorney fees, not based upon the written contract but upon the
oral modification. This, even though Appellee, from the witness
stand, proudly admitted that the oral modification was not in
writing as the parties had agreed. [Trial Transcript, Day 2, pp.
165-66].
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The

trial

court

ignored

the

law

and

the

parties'

agreement and awarded attorney fees to Appellee, doubling the size
of the judgment.
V.

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE VACATED WHERE THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND NO FINDING BY THE COURT
THAT APPELLEE EITHER PAID OR IS OBLIGATED TO PAY ATTORNEY
FEES.
Appellee

has produced

no evidence,

no

testimony,

no

documentation, absolutely nothing to substantiate the claim that he
paid or is obligated to pay attorney fees.
been

assumed

Appellee,

that

and

because

legal

even quantified

[R2450-2560].

representation

by

affidavit,

was

It has
provided

that Appellee

is

entitled to a judgment for "attorney fees."
Cook
assumption.

has

cited

three

Utah

cases

that

refute

this

Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467 (Utah 1992); Jones,

Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996);
Soft solutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 1 P. 3d 1095 (Utah
2000) .

The last of the trilogy clarifies the rule. An award of

attorney fees can only be made if attorney fees were actually
incurred.

Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d

at 1105, (Utah 2000).

"Paid," "incurred," or "obligated" is the

question.
This Court laid down the rule that an "attorney fee" is
a monetary obligation paid or owed from the client to the attorney.
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d at 1375
(Utah 1996) .
Before judgment in this case was entered, Cook argued
that Appellee had provided no evidence that he had paid or owed any
16

attorney fees.
environment

[R2450-2460] .

That, in this charged political

it was possible, even probable,

that

a political

opponent of Appellants was paying, or had obligated itself to pay,
Appellee's

attorney

fees.

In

response

to

Cooks'

objection,

Appellee's attorney quantified by affidavit the time spent but
conspicuously provided no evidence that Appellee had paid or was
obligated to pay any fees.
No

evidence was provided

in response

to Appellants'

direct assertion that no fees were owed or paid. No representation
agreement was provided. No contingency fee agreement was provided.
No billing statement was provided.
payment was provided.

Not

No cancelled check showing

even a statement

averring Appellee was obligated to pay.

in the affidavit

Such omission, when just

such a statement was made an issue by Cook, is affirmative evidence
that Appellees did not pay any fee nor were they obligated to pay
any fee.
In this case, where the court could easily take notice of
Cooks' numerous political opponents, iz is by no means improbable
that someone other than Appellee is obligated to pay attorney fees.
Without evidence of either payment: or obligation to pay
there is no legal basis to affirm an award cf attorney fees.

When

there is neither support for the award in the findings of the court
nor in the record, the award must be vacated.

Dixie State Bank v.

Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143
(Utah App. 1992) .

17

Further, attorney fees recoverable by contract are only
allowed in accordance with the terms of the contract.
Cushincr, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984).

Travner v.

This contract provides:

"The prevailing party to any litigation brought to enforce any
provision

of

this

attorneys fees."

Agreement

shall

be

awarded

its

costs

[Exhibit 17P, % 14, emphasis added].

and

Appellee

can only be awarded its attorney fees, not fees it never paid and
was never obligated to pay.
VI.

COOK SHOULD RECEIVE AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE HE
PREVAILED IN ENFORCING A PROVISION OF THE WRITTEN
CONTRACT.
Obviously if this Court reverses the judgment in favor of

Appellee, and/or if the Court finds that the contract in this case
does not

contemplate

recovery

of

fees

for

breach

of

an

oral

modification the contract prohibited, Cook was entitled to recover
his fees.

But even if Appellee's judgment were left intact, the

trial court erred in refusing Cook's fee application.
In refusing to award attorney fees to Cook, the trial
court made the error warned against in Mountain States Broadcasting
Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1989).

Instead cf taking a

"flexible and reasoned approach, the court mechanically applied"
the "net judgment" rule, using it as an ending, not a starting
point. Id. at 557. Indeed, she simply denied Cook his fees under %
14 of the Services Agreement:

"Defendant's Motion for an Award of

Attorney's Fees and Costs is denied.

Appellee was the prevailing

party in this lawsuit and is the only party who may be entitled to
an award of fees and costs in this matter."
18

[R2191-2192] .

Case law in this state makes it clear that the mechanical
approach is improper.

Each case must be evaluated on its own

facts, (Occidental/Nebraska Federal Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217
221 (Utah App. 1990)), with particular regard to the language of
the

contract

Bracken,

764

language

of

the parties have adopted.
P.2d

985, 988

Dixie

(Utah 1988).

the parties' contract

in this

State

Bank v.

When

analyzed,

the

case

leads to

the

conclusion that the "net judgment" rule has no application.6

These

parties agreed:
Attorneys Fees. The prevailing party to any
litigation brought to enforce any provision of
this Agreement shall be awarded its costs and
attorneys fees. (Emphasis added).
Exhibit 17 P, % 14.
In Brown v. Richards 840 P.2d

143

(Utah App. 1992),

attorney fees clauses in independent contracts forming a single
transaction were found to trigger separate awards of attorney fees
where the contracts provided for attorney fees to the prevailing
party

in

suits

"brought

to

enforce

the

provisions

of

this

agreement."

Id. at 154.

referred to

"this agreement", and more than one agreement was

involved,
agreement.

separate

The court reasoned that since the clause

awards were proper for enforcement

of each

See also, Elder v. Triax Company, 740 P.2d 1320 (Utah

6

The trial court and Plaintiff both have relied on
calculations purported to show percent victory for each party.
[Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re Attorneys Fees; Brief
of Appellee at 45, 47-49 and n. 22] . This type of analysis was
rejected in Brown, 840 P. 2d at 155. There is no basis in Utah for
using calculations to determine the prevailing party.
19

1987) (Plaintiff need not await outcome of counterclaim to receive
fee award because of independent sources of fee award).
If Appellee's claims are allowed to stand, they can only
stand as separate independent contracts.

(see, section IV, supra),

thus making the Brown analysis applicable and application of the
net judgment rule erroneous.

Cook prevailed under the terms of the

written contract, and is entitled to his attorney fees, even if
this court allows Appellee's judgment under the oral modification
agreement to stand.
Further, even if the oral modification and the written
contract is taken to be a single contract, Cook would still be
entitled to his attorneys fees for the claims on which he was
successful.

"Attorney fees are awardable only if provided for by

statute or contract

and, if by contract, only as the contract

allows by its terms."

Mountain States, at 555.

The attorney fees

provision here is significantly different than the provision in
Mountain States.
States stated:

The attorney fees provision at issue in Mountain
"In the event of commencement of suit by either

party to enforce the provisions of this Agreement, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to receive attorneys' fees and costs as a
court

may adjudge

granted."

reasonable

in addition

to any other

Mountain States, at 555, (emphasis added).

relief

Thus, the

attorney fees provision was to be triggered with reference to the
entire contract.
By contrast, the clause in this contract allows attorney
fees to "[t]he prevailing party [in] litigation brought to enforce
20

any provision of this Agreement."
added.

Exhibit

17P, 1(14, emphasis

The parties agreed that attorney fees would be triggered

with reference to individual provisions, not to the contract as a
whole.

At most, Appellee was successful on claims arising out of

the provisions of an oral modification of the written contract,
Cook was successful on claims arising out of completely separate
provisions

of

expenses.
to

the written

agreement

relating

to repayment

of

Thus, Cook is the prevailing party in litigation brought

enforce

certain

provisions

of

the

agreement,

and

is

thus

entitled to his costs and attorney fees under the specific language
of the parties contract.
This result is compelled by the reasoning in Trayner v.
Cushing, 688 P. 2d 856 (Utah 1984) . In Trayner, the parties entered
into a contract with an attorney fees clause stating, "If either
party fails to

[carry out and fulfill the terms specified] he

agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing this agreement, or any
right arising out of breach thereof, including attorney's fees."
Id. , at 857, emphasis added.

As in this case, the attorney fee

provision in Trayner was triggered not only with reference to the
agreement taken as a whole, but with reference to any right arising
out of it.

As in this case, the parties in Trayner each won some

relief from the other.

As in this case, the trial court in Trayner

awarded attorney fees only to the "net judgment" winner.

This

Court reversed.
Preliminary to finding both parties were entitled to
attorney fees, this Court noted that " [a] party is entitled to
21

those

fees

attributable

to

the

successful

vindication

contractual rights within the terms of their agreement."

of

Trayner,

at 858. After analyzing the attorney fee provision, and finding it
triggered

by

enforcement

contract, the Court

of

"any"

right

found each party

arising

"enforced"

out

the

of

the

agreement

against the other:
Each of these parties had rights under the
agreement that were denied him by the other.
Each was required to take legal action to
enforce
the
agreement
in one
or
more
particulars.
Each was successful on one or
more points and unsuccessful on others. Each
was therefore entitled to an award for
successfully enforcing the agreement against
the other.
Trayner, at 858.
Even if Appellee's judgment against Cook stands, Cook had
rights under their agreement that were denied him by the Appellee.
Cook was required to take legal action to enforce provisions of the
agreement in one or more particulars.
or more points and unsuccessful

Cook was successful on one

en others.

Cook is therefore

entitled to an award of attorney fees for successfully enforcing
the provisions of the agreement

against Appellee.

Trayner is

factually and legally so similar tc this case, the holding in that
case can be applied verbatim here:
The court was in error m making this award,
both in failing to recognize that some part of
the time charged by plaintiff's attorney was
spent in defending the counterclaim on which
he was not successful and in failing to award
defendant any fees for enforcing his rights
under the contract."
Trayner, at 858.
22

The case should be remanded with instructions to award Cook the
attorney fees incurred in enforcing those provisions on which he
was successful.
VII.

THE COURT CANNOT UPHOLD THIS JUDGMENT ON AN ALTERNATIVE
THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
Appellee

argues that the trial

court's

invalid oral

modification judgment can be upheld on the alternative theory of
unjust enrichment.

[Brief of Appellant at 25].

While it may be true that in some circumstances the
appellate courts can uphold a trial court on any valid basis, even
if the trial court erred on the basis it selected, this Court
cannot uphold the trial court on the basis of unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine.

As such it

can only be invoked when there is no adequate remedy at law.

When

the parties have entered into an express agreement their remedy is
at

law,

and

an

alternative

enrichment is not available.

equitable

remedy

such

as

unjust

UTCO v. Sharpe, 2 001 Ut. App. 117,

419 Utah Adv. Rep.7 (Utah App. 2001) and cases cited therein.
In
agreement.

this

case

the

parties

Their remedy is at law.

entered

into

a

written

The court cannot uphold the

judgment under the equitable theory of unjust enrichment.
VIII.

APPELLEE'S WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND PART PERFORMANCE ARGUMENT
DOES NOT SAVE THIS ORAL MODIFICATION THAT WAS NOT REDUCED
TO WRITING BECAUSE APPELLEE DID NOTHING THAT WAS NOT
REFERABLE TO THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT.
Part performance, in order to replace the requirement of

a writing, must be exclusively referable to the supposed
agreement.

oral

Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983) . In Martin
23

the plaintiff had worked long hours each day for 3 0 years for a
rancher, claiming that he did so based on an oral agreement that
the ranch would be conveyed to him.
judgment for the worker.
decision,

finding

that

The trial

court

entered

This Court reversed the trial court's
the actions

of the plaintiff

were

not

exclusively referable to the supposed oral modification of the
employment agreement.

The Court found that long hard days were

typical of ranch work and plaintiff was being paid a salary for
that work.
Similarly,

in

this

case

Appellee,

in

the

written

contract, agreed to work during the convention cycle for $40,000.00
and thereafter through the primary and general election cycles for
15% of the PAC money raised plus $4,000.00 per month.
K

4.]

This

agreements.

agreement

was

typical

of

[Exhibit 17p

political

consulting

The pre-convention work is labor intensive with much

one-on-one work with convention delegates.

Thereafter the focus

shifts from the labor intensive work to fund raising and media
spending.

Thus, all of the work performed by Appellee that he

claims is "part performance" is referable to the written agreement.
Part performance will not permit this judgment to stand.
IX.

CONCLUSION
The judgment in favor of Appellee for $162,962.0 0 was

based on a cause of action that does not exist
modification

of

a

written

contract

which

modification--and therefore should be vacated.

in Utah--oral

prohibits

oral

The judgment in

favor of Appellee for attorney fees in the amount of $195,8 00.83
24

should be vacated because it was based on Appellee prevailing on a
non-existent

cause

of

action

and

because

Appellee

presented

absolutely no evidence that he paid or was obligated to pay the
fees.
Cook prevailed on his claim for breach of the written
contract.

The court should remand the case to the trial court for

a determination of attorney fees under the terms of the written
contract.

Even if this court finds that Appellee's judgment for

breach should stand, Cook is entitled to an award of attorney fees
because the trial court erroneously applied the "net judgment"
rule.
DATED this

L

^ '

day of May, 2001.
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